Outbreak of human monkeypox, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996 to 1997. by Hutin, Y. J. et al.
434 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 3, May–June 2001
Research
Human monkeypox, a sporadic smallpox-like zoonotic
viral exanthema that occurs in the rain forests of Central and
West Africa, was discovered in 1970 (1-3). The illness is
caused by an orthopoxvirus, monkeypox virus, which was first
isolated from primate tissues (4). Animal antibody surveys in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; former Zaire)
suggested that squirrels play a major role as a reservoir of the
virus and that humans are sporadically infected (3,5,6).
Human-to-human transmission occurs with an incubation
period of 12 days (range 7-21 days) (3).
After smallpox eradication, surveillance for human
monkeypox from 1981 to 1986 in the DRC identified 338 cases
(67% confirmed by virus culture). The case-fatality rate was
9.8% for persons not vaccinated with vaccinia (smallpox)
vaccine, which was about 85% efficacious in preventing
human monkeypox (3,7). The secondary attack rate in
unvaccinated household members was 9.3%, and 28% of case-
patients reported an exposure to another case-patient during
the incubation period. Transmission chains beyond secondary
were rare (8,9). A mathematical model to assess the potential
for monkeypox to spread in susceptible populations after
cessation of vaccinia vaccination indicated that person-to-
person transmission would not sustain monkeypox in
humans without repeated reintroduction of the virus from the
wild (7).
In 1996, 71 suspected human monkeypox cases were
reported from the Katako-Kombe Health Zone, Kasai
Oriental, DRC. These initial reports suggested predominant
person-to-person transmission and prolonged chains of
transmission. Two cases were confirmed by monkeypox virus
isolation from lesion material (10). In February 1997, an
investigation was initiated (11). Our report describes
epidemiologic observations and laboratory results supporting
the conclusion that repeated animal reintroduction of
monkeypox virus is needed to sustain the disease in the local
human population.
Methods
Epidemiologic and Clinical Studies
Before civil unrest in the area curtailed the study, a
dwelling-to-dwelling search was conducted for cases that
occurred from February 1996 and February 1997 in 12
villages (total population 4,057) in the Katako-Kombe Health
Zone, located around Akungula, a village reported to be the
epicenter of the current outbreak. A clinical case of
monkeypox was defined as the occurrence of fever with a rash
recognized as being similar to that in a reference photo
provided by the World Health Organization. Monkeypox cases
were classified as active until desquamation of the rash. After
desquamation, cases were identified retrospectively by
interview and examination for residual scars. Onset dates
were estimated by using local event calendars.
Patients (or their adult respondent) who agreed to
participate were queried by using a standardized data
collection instrument to obtain information on demograph-
ics, signs and symptoms of disease, exposures to wild
animals, presence of a smallpox vaccination scar, and
exposure to another patient. Consenting participants
underwent a physical examination, and a blood sample for
serum was obtained.
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Animal Studies
Local trappers were asked to capture and bring to the
study veterinarian wild animals, especially rodents,
squirrels, and nonhuman primates, for which the trappers
were paid as an incentive. Animals were processed in a field
laboratory (12), identified to genus and species, and bled for
serum. Representative voucher specimens of each animal
were preserved in 10% formalin for definitive identification.
Laboratory Studies
Human and animal sera were clarified by low-speed
centrifugation, immediately stored in liquid nitrogen, and
shipped to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in Atlanta. At CDC, an aliquot of each serum was
heated at 56oC for 30 minutes, the following tests were
performed: 1) vaccinia virus hemagglutination-inhibition (HAI)
assay (13); 2) monkeypox 50% plaque-reduction neutralization
assay (13); and 3) Western blot assays for immunoglobulin G
(IgG) against monkeypox antigens essentially by using
Towbin’s and colleagues’ methods adapted to mini-transblot
and multiscreen apparatuses (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA) (14).
Western blotting used selected human sera and antigen
preparations that consisted of a soluble antigen (20x culture
medium concentrate) from monkeypox virus-infected Vero
cells (15). Positive controls consisted of sera collected in the
1980s from convalescent-phase monkeypox cases from the
prospective study in the DRC and from vaccinia-vaccinated
persons; negative controls consisted of sera collected in the
1980s from DRC inhabitants with no history of vaccinia
vaccination or monkeypox. Human sera were also tested for
antibodies against varicella virus by using kits to detect
human IgM or IgG by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays
(ELISA; Wampole Laboratories, Cranberry, NJ). Samples of
crusted scab or pustule lesion were cultured for monkeypox
virus using the monkey cell lines Vero, LLCMK-2, or OMK
(13,16), and assayed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
amplification for monkeypox virus-specific DNA (16,17) and
for varicella virus gene 1 (P. Pellett, pers. comm.). In addition,
the gene encoding the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of selected
monkeypox isolates was sequenced by fluorescence-based
methods (Applied Biosystems, Inc., Foster City, CA).
Available duplicate coded sera were tested anonymously in
Kinshasa, DRC, for antibodies against HIV (Vironostika
Human Form II ELISA, Organon Teknika, Denmark).
The relatedness of isolates was examined by comparing
DNA restriction endonuclease patterns with patterns of
previously mapped monkeypox virus isolates (18) and by
comparing the hemagglutinin gene sequences with cognate
sequences of other monkeypox isolates.
Statistical Methods
Attack rates were calculated by using a census conducted
during the dwelling-to-dwelling case search; information on
the age and sex of each person living in Akungula was also
obtained. Secondary attack rates within households were
calculated by dividing the number of cases that occurred 7 to
21 days following one or more index cases in a household
(first-generation secondary cases) by the total number of
household members, excluding index cases. Confidence
intervals (CI) for proportions were calculated with exact
methods and compared with Fisher’s exact tests as
appropriate by using Epi-Info software (19).
Results
Epidemiologic and Clinical Studies
Eighty-eight clinical cases (7 active and 81 retrospective-
ly identified) were discovered in 9 of the 12 villages (attack
rate 22 per 1,000). Fifty (56.8%) of 88 case-patients were male;
the median age at onset was 10 years (quartiles 5-19; range 1
month to 62 years).
The number of clinical cases reported per month
increased from February to August 1996, followed by a decline
until January 1997 and a resurgence of cases in February
1997 (Figure 1). Attack rates in the villages ranged from zero
to 105 per 1,000 population in Akungula, where 42 cases were
identified in 14 of the 62 village households.
In Akungula, where the age and sex distributions of the
population were available, the attack rate was identical for
males and females, but was higher (30 of 206 = 146/1,000) in
children <15 years of age than in persons 15 to 24 years old
(4 of 85 = 47 /1,000) and >25 years of age (8 of 109 = 73/1,000).
Of 78 retrospectively identified case-patients for whom
information was available, 40 (51.3%) reported swelling
consistent with lymphadenopathy. All 75 examined patients
had scars from a rash (median 50; range 4 to 830; standard
deviation 179). Thirteen (15.5%) of 84 patients for whom
information was available had a vaccination scar on the upper
left arm compatible with prior vaccinia vaccination; all
patients were >20 years of age. Alopecia was seen in three
cases with acute rash illness. Three deaths occurred among 81
of the 88 cases for which follow-up information was available
(3.7% case-fatality rate), all in children <3 years of age who
died within 3 weeks of rash onset. No information was
available to attribute the deaths to monkeypox, superinfec-
tion, or other cause.
Seven case-patients (six in a single household) had active
disease at the time of the investigation. Each had
lymphadenopathy and more than 100 crusty skin lesions.
Five had a rash on the soles and palms. Sixty-two (73%) of 85
case-patients for whom information was available reported
exposure to another patient 7 to 21 days before onset of their
Figure 1. Human monkeypox cases by month of onset in 12 villages,
according to results of neutralization assay, Katako-Kombe Health
Zone, February 1996 to February 1997.436 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 3, May–June 2001
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illness. The remaining 23 (27%) patients reported either no
exposure to other cases (n=13; 15%) or an exposure to another
case from 0 to 6 days before onset of illness (n=10; 12%). Dates
of onset for patients who reported no exposure to other cases
during the incubation period were distributed throughout the
study period (11). Exposures during the incubation period
that were reported by all six patients who resided in a single
household and who had active disease at the time of this
investigation included exposure to a patient within the
household and eating monkey, gazelle, pig, and rat.
The 88 clinical cases were identified for 39 households, in
which 297 persons resided (overall attack rate in affected
households = 30%). For 240 household members for whom
information was available, rash that met the clinical case
definition developed in 20 in 7 to 21 days after exposure to >1
index cases in a household (household secondary attack rate
8.3 per 100; 95% CI 5.2% to 12.6%).
Eating wild animals was common for all patients.
However, patients who had no exposure to other case-patients
during the incubation period were more likely to eat
porcupine at least once a month (Table 1). All queried
participants reported trapping animals less frequently.
Laboratory Studies
Human monkeypox was confirmed in all seven active
cases by virus isolation and monkeypox virus-specific DNA
amplification from skin lesion samples; antibodies against
orthopoxvirus were detected in two by neutralization assay,
in three by HAI assay, and in six by Western blotting. In
addition, IgM antibodies against varicella virus were detected
in five active cases in patients who lived in the same
household. Varicella virus DNA was detected in lesion
material from two of these patients.
Seventy-two of the 81 retrospectively identified cases
provided a serum sample, although 2 were low in volume.
Orthopoxvirus antibodies were detected by neutralization
assay in 39 (54%, Figure 1) of the 72 sera; by HAI in 51 (73%)
of 70 sera, and by a new, nonvalidated Western blot test in 49
(68%) of 72 sera. Thirty-eight (54%) of 70 available sera were
positive by all three tests, 45 (64%) were positive by two tests,
and 62 (89%) were positive by at least one test. Western
blotting and HAI test results were concordant for 79% of the
sera; Western blotting and neutralization test results agreed
for 83% of the sera; and HAI and neutralization test results
agreed for 79% of the sera. Fifty-five (76%) of the 72 patients
who provided serum had detectable varicella IgG antibodies,
1 had varicella IgM, and none showed detectable HIV antibodies.
Based on DNA assays (16-18), monkeypox virus isolates
from the seven active cases appeared virtually identical to
each other and very closely related to two isolates from
humans in 1996 and an isolate from a squirrel trapped in the
Equateur Province of the DRC in 1985. Analysis of sequences
coding for the viral HA protein (Figure 2) indicated that
viruses isolated in the DRC since 1970 comprised a clade
distinguishable from a clade comprising isolates from other
African countries and from outbreaks in primate-holding
facilities in Europe and the United States. The group of nine
isolates from the 1996-97 outbreak, which showed identical
HA sequences, and from the squirrel from 1985 constituted a
subset of the clade of examined viruses previously isolated in
the DRC.
Animal Studies
Fifty-nine captured animals representing 14 species were
tested. Sera from 42% of the various squirrel species, from 16%
of Gambian rats, and from an elephant shrew and a domestic pig
showed orthopoxvirus neutralizing antibodies (Table 2).
Table 1. Exposure to wild animals reported by monkeypox case-patients
according to history of exposure to another case-patient, Katako-Kombe
Health zone, February 1996 to February 1997
Cases without Cases with
exposure to  exposure to
other case- other case-
patients during patients during
Exposures reported incubation incubation
to occur usually   (N=23)   (N=62)
on a monthly basis (#)  (%) (#)  (%) p value
Exposure to squirrels
  Trapping   2   8.7   9 14.8 0.79
  Exposure to raw meat 11 47.8 33 54.1 0.78
  Eating 19 86.4 52 85.2 1.00
Exposure to monkeys
  Trapping   1   4.3   4   6.6 1.00
  Exposure to raw meat 16 69.6 34 55.7 0.36
  Eating 21 91.3 58 95.1 0.61
Exposure to rats
  Trapping   5 21.7 18 29.5 0.66
  Exposure to raw meat 13 56.5 40 65.6 0.60
  Eating 22 95.7 55 90.2 0.66
Exposure to porcupines
  Trapping   1   4.3   3   4.9 1.00
  Exposure to raw meat 12 52.2 24 39.3 0.41
  Eating 22 95.7 42 68.9 0.02
Exposure to gazelles
  Trapping   1   4.3   2   3.3 1.00
  Exposure to raw meat 14 56.5 28 45.9 0.53
  Eating 21 91.3 47 77.0 0.21
Figure 2. Phylogenetic inference relationships of the open reading
frames encoding the viral hemagglutinin protein of various
monkeypox virus isolates and selected strains of vaccinia, variola,
and cowpox viruses. Nucleotide sequences of polymerase chain
reaction-generated amplicons were analyzed using PAUP parsimony
analysis software version 3.1.1, as described (10). Parsimony
analysis used 5,000 bootstraps and  weighted the sequences for a
transition-transversion ratio of 2 (bootstrap confidence intervals
shown on branches).Vol. 7, No. 3, May–June 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases 437
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Conclusion
The epidemiologic and laboratory evidence presented
here suggests that this monkeypox outbreak is the largest
reported. Epidemiologic features of monkeypox that differed
from those described during an intensified prospective study
in the DRC in the 1980s included an increase in the proportion
of patients reporting an exposure to another case during the
incubation period (28% in the 1980s, 73% this study) and the
clustering of successive cases within households, with as
many as eight consecutive cases in one instance (3,10).
Prospective surveillance in the 1980s in the DRC
provided opportunities to observe most patients with active-
stage monkeypox; thus, skin lesion samples were available for
virus isolation to confirm clinical diagnosis. In contrast, the
present study identified most patients retrospectively and
relied on serologic testing for confirmation of the diagnosis;
only seven clinically active cases could be confirmed by virus
isolation and PCR (17) for monkeypox virus. Because
monkeypox is the only known indigenous orthopoxvirus of
Africa that infects humans systemically, seropositive cases
showing genus-specific antibodies can be reasonably
interpreted as cases that had a monkeypox virus infection
(20). Of 72 retrospectively identified cases tested, 54% had
antibodies by plaque-reduction assay, a preferred test for
verifying orthopoxvirus infections during smallpox eradica-
tion (20,21). However, this neutralization test was only 83%
sensitive for the detection of vaccinia vaccine-induced
antibodies and may have been negative (3) in some patients
with monkeypox virus infection during this study interval. A
higher proportion of sera from retrospectively identified cases
(73%) tested positive by the HAI test, which had a higher
sensitivity (96%) than the neutralization test for the
identification of vaccinia-induced antibodies (22). However,
the HAI test may be less specific, and antibody titers detected
by it decrease rapidly after infection and would be unlikely to
be residual from prior vaccination in the small percentage of
patients who had been vaccinated (3,21,23). Finally, 72% of
sera from retrospectively identified cases tested positive in a
new, nonvalidated Western blot orthopoxvirus antibody test
for which sensitivity and specificity have not been
determined. Chickenpox, which can be mistaken for
monkeypox (24), was reported in the area during the study
period. Some patients may have had dual infection by
monkeypox and varicella viruses. Within one household, five
patients from whom monkeypox virus was isolated showed
serologic evidence of recent varicella virus infection, and two
of those had detectable varicella virus DNA in skin lesion
samples. Thus, a substantial percentage of cases may have
been chickenpox, thereby explaining why the case-fatality
rate from this study (3.7%) was lower than the 9.6%
previously reported (3,24). However, the presence of
antibodies against orthopoxviruses by three different assays
in 54% of patients suggests that varicella virus was not
responsible for most cases during the study period.
The 1996-97 crude secondary attack rate of about 8% in
households cannot be compared with the 3.7% risk of attack
for household contacts from the 1981-1986 study (3) because
the proportion of susceptible (unvaccinated) persons in
household members increased markedly from 1981-1986 to
1996-97. However, the 1996-97 secondary attack rate within
households was similar to the 1981-1986 rates (3) of 9.3% for
unvaccinated household members. This similarity is
consistent with the high degree of similarity noted in
comparing current monkeypox virus isolate DNAs with DNAs
of isolates from the DRC in the 1970s, including the HA
sequences (Figure 2). While the virus and its person-to-person
transmission potential have not changed substantially, the
proportion of susceptible persons among exposed household
members increased most likely because vaccinia vaccination
ceased after smallpox eradication. The reduced herd
immunity probably also caused a higher proportion of cases to
be attributable to person-to-person transmission, as the
increase in the proportion of patients who reported exposure
to another patient during the incubation interval would
suggest. HIV was not a cofactor of this outbreak because no
HIV antibodies were detected in patients’ sera.
Exposure to an animal reservoir might have been the
source of infection for at least 27% of patients who reported no
exposure to other patients during the incubation period. Past
animal studies pointed to several species of squirrels as
animal reservoirs (5,6). Although the possibility of infection of
animals with another unknown indigenous orthopoxvirus
cannot be ruled out in animals with neutralizing antibodies,
the results of our investigation suggest that, in addition to
squirrels, Gambian rats may play a role in monkeypox virus
circulation. Villagers ate a number of different animals, and it
was impossible to draw any conclusions as to whether any one
species was a greater risk factor than any other. However,
antibody surveys could be used to evaluate porcupines as a
possible reservoir (Table 1), which was not done during our
investigation because no porcupines were captured by trappers.
Our study had several limitations, some of which related
to the brevity imposed by the civil unrest. Most cases were
identified retrospectively and without a case-control group;
thus, they could not be confirmed by a serologic test for which
Table 2. Species of animals caught in the wild and monkeypox virus
plaque reduction neutralization antibody assay results, Katako-Kombe
Health Zone, February 23-27, 1997
   No. Proportion
Animal species    Common name Tested Pos.     pos.
Cercopithecus Spot-nosed monkey   2   0     0.0%
  ascanius
Cercopithecus Debrazza monkey   1   0     0.0%
  neglectus
Perodicticus Bosman’s potto   1   0     0.0%
  potto
Galogoides Demidoff galago   2   0     0.0%
  demidovi
Genetta Genet   1   0     0.0%
  rubiginosa
Sus scrofa Domestic pig   1   1 100.0%
Praomys Forest rat   1   0     0.0%
  jacksoni
Cricetomys Gambian rat 19   3   15.8%
  emini
Cavia sp. Guinea pig   3   0     0.0%
Petrodromus Elephant shrew   3   1   33.3%
  tetradactylus
Dendrohyrax Tree hyrax   1   0     0.0%
  arboreus
Funisciurus Thomas’s tree squirrel   4   2   50.0%
  anerythrus
Funisciurus Kuhl’s tree squirrel 18   7   38.9%
  congicus
Heliosciurus Sun squirrel   2   1   50.0%
  rufobrachium
Total 59 15   25.4%438 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 3, May–June 2001
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the sensitivity and the specificity had been measured using a
standard technique and case-control sera. Because informa-
tion was not available regarding the vaccination status of
other members of the patients’ households, secondary attack
rates within households could not be calculated according to
the vaccination status. We did not assess the environmental
changes that could have facilitated this outbreak, including
increases in household sizes, rates of monkeypox virus
infection in the animal population, and a change in rate and
type of exposure to wild animals among residents. We were
unable to attribute infections in patients who reported an
exposure to another patient during the incubation period to
person-to-person transmission because some of these patients
may also have been exposed to infected animals. Finally,
patients with a history of exposure to a patient during the
incubation period were the only controls available to generate
hypotheses regarding the type of animal exposure possibly
associated with infection in patients not reporting an
exposure to other patients during the incubation period. This
aspect may have caused bias because cases clustered within
households where exposures to animals may have been
identical and because cases may have been misclassified as to
their purported source of infection.
There is no evidence to date that person-to-person
transmission alone can sustain monkeypox in the local
population. However, our study suggests that in a population
with low herd immunity, person-to-person transmission and
repeated introduction of virus from the animal reservoir may
lead to more and larger clusters of human monkeypox cases in
African rain forest areas (25). Further studies are needed to
measure the sensitivity and the specificity of the serologic
tests currently available so they can be used in the future to
better confirm retrospectively identified cases, identify the
type of animal or patient exposures associated with
acquisition of illness, and evaluate the respective roles of
person-to-person and animal-to-human transmission. How-
ever, access to the Kasai region has been limited since our
study, and little information has become available to better
document the current dynamics of monkeypox occurrences or
improve World Health Organization recommendations to
prevent human monkeypox more substantially.
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